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Abstract 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network made of thousands of sensing elements 
called as nodes with wireless capabilities. Their application is varied and diverse 
ranging from military to domestic and household. As the world of self-organizing 
sensor networks tip to the edge of maximum utilization, their wider deployment is 
adding pressure on the security front.  Powerful laptops and workstations make it more 
challenging for small sensors.  In addition, there are many security challenges in WSN, 
e.g- confidentiality, authentication, freshness, integrity etc. Contributions of this work 
are as follows: 
 “Symmetric” security implementation:  This thesis work designs a symmetric-
key based security in sensor hardware in the Link layer of sensor network 
protocols. Link Layer security can protect a wireless network by denying access 
to the network itself before a user is successfully authenticated. This prevents 
attacks against the network infrastructure and protects the network from 
devastating attacks.  
  “Public key” implementation in sensor hardware:  Asymmetric key 
techniques are attractive for authentication data or session keys. Traditional 
schemes like RSA require considerable amounts of resources which in the past 
has limited their use. This thesis has implemented Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) in Mica2 hardware, which is an approach to public-key cryptography 
based on the mathematics of elliptic curves.  
  6 
 Quantitative overhead analysis:  This thesis work analyzes the wireless 
communication overhead (No. of packets transmitted) vs the (transmit and 
receive) energy consumed in mJoules and memory storage overhead (bytes) for 
ECC as compared to the symmetric counterpart for the implemented WSN 
security protocols. 
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Chapter 1    
Introduction 
 
“It has become apalingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our 
humanity”  
~Albert Einstein 
Recently technology has started to play a very important role in our lives. There 
is an ocean of devices we use daily. Focusing on new applications enabled by wireless 
networks we can see considerable excitement on the broader deployment of its 
applications. The study of wireless sensor networks is challenging in that it requires an 
enormous breadth of knowledge from a wide variety of disciplines.  
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network made of thousands of nano-
computers with onboard sensor boards. They are called nodes. The nodes self-organize 
their networks, rather than having a pre-programmed network topology. One of the 
primary purposes of WSN is to gather information and send it to the base station for 
accumulation and/or analysis. However as is it obvious due to the nature of wireless 
network that the data is freely available in air. The loss of confidentiality and integrity 
and the threat of denial of service (DoS) attacks are risks typically associated with 
wireless communications. Unauthorized users may gain access to agency systems and 
information, corupt he agency‘s dat, consume network bandwidth, degrade network 
performance, and launch attacks that prevent authorized users from accessing the 
network, or use agency resources to launch attacks on other networks. 
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There are many security challenges in WSN [12]. Some of them are as follows:  
Confidentiality, Authentication, Freshness, and Integrity etc. Because of the limitations 
due to battery life, nodes are built with power conservation in mind, and generally 
spend large amounts of time in a low-power "sleep" mode or processing the sensor data.  
This work reveals the issues and challenging problems involved with the security 
dimension/parameter for the sensor nodes.  It also advocates a robust solution approach-
use of public key cryptography considering the small memory, energy overhead and 
strong security mesh provided.  Overall, this thesis ponders on several on-demand 
sensor node issues and makes several important contributions to an ever-growing active 
research and branch of wireless sensor network security. 
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Chapter 2  
Background 
 
2.1 Sensor Networks: 
The terminology sensor network is referred to a heterogeneous system 
combining tiny sensors and actuators with general-purpose computing elements [1]. The 
important characteristics are as follows: 
 
1. This huge sensor sea consists of innumerable low-power and low-cost wireless nodes. 
Their primary job is to monitor and report the conditions in the deployed environment. 
 
2. The sensor networks have limited space and hence these hefty cryptographic 
protocols cannot reside on them. On the contrary these limitations can work in our favor 
as the adversaries have to also match the capabilities of the sensors, for e.g. even they 
are limited by the bandwidth restrictions (number of packets per second), hence they 
can‘t eavesdrop by bombarding it with fake messages. 
 
3. Energy is the most important element of concern, it can be truly said that energy 
saved is energy earned. Every iota of energy used brings the wireless nodes closer to 
their end. 
 
4. The sensor network communicates in a broadcast medium; hence this wireless media 
is very unsafe. Also the adversaries can use this to flood the network and drain the 
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sensors energy. It can be typified by the term pursuit evasion game [6] as there is a 
group of pursuers who attempt to capture the evaders. 
A simple diagram will be as follows: [4] 
 
Figure 1: Sensor Networks and Adversaries in action 
 
2.2 Kind of Attacks [6] [15] [30] [31]: 
The various kinds of attacks are as follows: 
 Jamming: interferences of radio frequencies 
 Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information (flooding: Bombardment 
of messages by the invaders) 
 Drop, forge, modify, deletion of message packets 
 Selective forwarding 
 Sinkhole attacks 
 Sybil attacks 
 Wormholes 
 HELLO flood attacks 
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 Acknowledgement spoofing. 
 
Some of them we will see in detail as follows: 
 
2.2.1 Replay Attack: 
Under this attack the adversary targets the routing information exchanged 
between nodes. It alters/ replays several times to create a loop to repel the network 
traffic. It may also generate false error messages, partition the network, increase end-to-
end latency, etc. 
 
2.2.2 Selective forwarding: 
In a selective forwarding attack, malicious nodes may refuse to forward certain 
messages and simply drop them, ensuring that they are not propagated any further. An 
adversary interested in suppressing or modifying packets originating from a few select 
nodes can reliably forward the remaining traffic and limit suspicion of their 
wrongdoing. 
 
2.2.3 Sink Hole Attack: 
Sinkhole attacks typically work by making a compromised node look especially 
attractive to surrounding nodes with respect to the routing algorithm. For instance, an 
adversary could spoof or replay an advertisement for an extremely high quality route to 
a base station. Some protocols might actually try to verify the quality of route with end-
to-end acknowledgements containing reliability or latency information. In this case a 
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laptop class device can act as a very good sink hole. It should be noted that the reason 
sensor networks are particularly susceptible to sinkhole attacks is due to their 
specialized communication pattern. 
 
2.2.4 Acknowledgement spoofing: 
Several sensor network routing algorithms rely on implicit or explicit link layer 
acknowledgements. Due to the inherent broadcast medium, an adversary can spoof link 
layer acknowledgments for ‗overheard‘ packets adresed to neighboring nodes. 
Goals include convincing the sender that a weak link is strong or that a dead or disabled 
node is alive. 
 
2.2.5 HELLO flood attack: 
Many protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO packets to announce 
themselves to their neighbors, and a node receiving such a packet may assume that it is 
within (normal) radio range of the sender. This assumption may be false: a laptop-class 
attacker broadcasting routing or other information with large enough transmission 
power could convince every node in the network that the adversary is its neighbor. 
 
2.2.6 The Sybil attack: 
In a Sybil attack, a single node presents multiple identities to other nodes in the 
network. The Sybil attack can significantly reduce the effectiveness of fault-tolerant 
schemes such as distributed storage, dispersity and multi path routing, and topology 
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maintenance. Replicas, storage partitions, or routes believed to be using disjoint nodes 
could in actuality be using a single adversary presenting multiple identities. 
 
2.2.7 Worm Hole Attack: 
An adversary situated close to a base station may be able to completely disrupt 
routing by creating a well-placed wormhole. An adversary could convince nodes who 
would normally be multiple hops from a base station that they are only one or two hops 
away via the wormhole. This can create a sinkhole: since the adversary on the other side 
of the wormhole can artificially provide a high quality route to the base station, 
potentially all traffic in the surrounding area will be drawn through it if alternate routes 
are significantly less attractive. This will most likely always be the case when the 
endpoint of the wormhole is relatively far from a base station. 
 
2.3 Security goals for Wireless Sensor Networks: 
There are a number of important goals for a link layer security mechanism in sensor 
networks as described below: 
 
2.3.1 Access control:  
Access control means there should be a control over access to the wireless 
network. The link layer protocol should prevent unauthorized/unknown entities from 
participating in the network communication. The pre deployment process should make 
the sensors capable of detecting messages from unauthorized nodes and reject them.  
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2.3.2 Message authenticity and integrity: 
These are very closely related terms and should be understood clearly. Message 
authenticity means that the receiver node should be able to distinguish if the message 
packet is from the brother node or if it has been modified by an adversary. This 
modification is usually done when the message is in transit. Message integrity means 
that the message packet should be received the way it was sent and not modified. Both 
these concerns can be resolved by including a message authentication code with each 
packet.  
 
2.3.3 Confidentiality: 
Confidentiality means keeping information secret from unauthorized parties. It 
is typically achieved with encryption. Preferably, an encryption scheme should not only 
prevent message recovery, but also prevent adversaries from learning even partial 
information about the messages that have been encrypted. This strong property is 
known as semantic security.  
 
2.3.4 Explicit omission: 
The enemy node / station often wants to take advantage of the fact that sensor 
nodes have limited space to store messages and hence they keep replaying the same 
message to drain energy and prevent later messages from reaching the designated 
destination. Since the message originated from an authorized sender, the same receiver 
will accept it again. Replay protection is a difficult problem when there is a limited 
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amount of state that each recipient keeps. A common defense solution is to include an 
increasing counter with every message and reject messages with old counter values. 
 
2.4 Platform (motes): 
In this thesis we will see a representative sensor structure called mica2 and 
mica2dots. It is from the Crossbow Company [2]. The operating system is TinyOS 
about which we will discuss in detail later on.  
The mica2 processor is an 8 bit, 7.3 mhz Atmel CPU with  
128 Kb of instruction memory,  
4 Kb of data ram and  
512 kb of flash memory 
1850 mAh capacity 
Low powered radio from Chipcon which has a range of 100 meters. 
 
Figure 2: Block Diagram of Mica2 platform 
Here is the actual sensor device: 
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Figure 3: Mica2 Sensor 
 
Figure 4: Mica2 sensor board 
The mica2dot has the following specifications: 
1. Atmel processor  
2. 4.0 MHz clock  
3. 128 kB of Flash for program memory 
4. 512 KB flash memory 
5. 1 programmable LED 
6. 560 mAh capacity 
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The block diagram of mica2 dot is as follows: 
 
Figure 5: Block Diagram of Mica2 dot 
 
2.5 Environment: 
We used Cygwin which is Linux-like environment for Windows [3]. It is similar to 
dual boot operating systems except for the easy switch between windows and Linux 
emulation. It consists of two parts:  
1) A DLL library (cygwin1.dll) which acts as a Linux API emulation layer providing the 
necessary Linux API functionality.  
2) A collection of tools, which provides a Linux look and feel in terms of directory 
structure and scripting. 
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Chapter 3 
 
TinyOS (Operating System for tiny devices) 
 
TinyOS is the operating system for low power, scalable wireless embedded sensor 
networks.  Two of its eminent features are open-source and component based framework. 
It is open source as the programmers can read, redistribute, and modify the source code. 
They can also improve and are welcome to discover and fix bugs. It features a 
component-based framework for modular architecture and providing opportunity to 
improve the connectivity. Components are statically linked hence it enables rapid 
innovation and implementation. Also leads to code reusability. More on modularity will 
come in further sections. Needless to say minuscule code size is preferred as severe 
memory constraints are prevalent in sensor networks. TinyOS supports this and hence it 
is said to be light weight. The key elements are Networking / communication and power 
management. 
 
3.1 Does TinyOs have an ISO model? 
Tinyos is an operating system as stated above so the next question should be does 
it have an ISO-OSI model? Well the answer is yes and no. Yes because it has a similar 
structure and no because it doesn‘t folow it hat strictly. Thes tiny devices don‘t have 
enough memory to accommodate the lavish 7 layer design. Following depicts it better: 
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Figure 6: TinyOs version of ISO Model 
 
3.2 Architecture: 
TinyOS has an Event-driven architecture. Some of the other important features are: 
1. Single shared stack 
2. No kernel in the traditional sense  
3. No process/memory management 
4. No virtual memory 
5. No dynamic run time allocation of memory 
6. It uses global variables to preserve unity 
7. Also uses pointers to save code space 
The layer structure is as follows: 
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Figure 7: TinyOs Layer Structure 
 
3.3 Main Attraction – Memory Model of TinyOs: 
 
In TinyOs the memory is allocated at run time, also the components are statically 
linked at compile time to determine the size requirement. The use of local variable is 
limited and when used is saved on stack. Use of global variable is more prevalent along 
with pointers to save memory. 
 
3.4 Modularity of TinyOs: 
As mentioned before TinyOs has modular structure. There are two kinds of components: 
 
1. Module: It is the component written with code 
2. Configuration: It is the components wired together  
 
In short components wire together as a configuration to form any application. 
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Figure 8: Configuration Wiring 
 
The green interfaces provide the link and the red interfaces uses the links. 
Every TinyOs component has a frame, function and interfaces. The frame keeps a track 
of the internal/ initial state. It consists of global variables and other fixed entities. The 
function carries the code; it has the commands, events and tasks which are written in 
simple C code called NesC. The commands are the entry point and the events act as call 
back function. At the entry point the parameters are passed on the stack with the return 
status. The interfaces provide the link. It provides the interface boundary for the 
components. The following diagram explains better:  
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Figure 9: NesC component 
 
3.4.1 More on NesC: 
The code is written in NesC. The NesC output is a‗C‘ program file that is compiled and 
linked using gnu-gcctools for a specific Mote. The preprocessor does the conversion. The 
NesC file xtension is ―.nc‖. C stands for configuration.  C distinguishes between the 
interfaces and components that provide it.  
 
Figure 10: Configuration  
 
M is for module and it indicates that a single component contains both module and 
configuration. 
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Figure 11: Configuration and Module 
 
3.4.2 NesC Jargon: 
Interfaces Collection of events and commands 
Module Basic component implemented in NesC 
Configuration Component made from wiring other components 
Implementation Contains codes and variables for modules/ configuration 
Provides/ uses Defines /uses interfaces provided by component 
As Alias interface to another name 
Call Execute the command 
Signal Execute the event 
Post Place task on execution queue 
Task Computationally intensive low level job 
Async Commands/ events executed asynchronously 
Atomic Atomic (cant stop) execution of statement 
Norace Eliminates race conditions 
Table 1: NesC Jargon 
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Figure 12: Blink Text 
Correlation: 
 
Figure 13: Blink Diagram 
List of Libraries: 
Broadcast Basic Broadcast command 
Deluge Over the air programming 
X mesh State of art mesh networking stack 
Queue Handles send/ receive radio packets 
ReliableRoute Original Cross bow mesh networking stack 
Table 2: List of Libraries
  32 
Chapter 4 
 
TinySec: a link layer security implementation in hardware 
 
TinySec[1] is a link layer architecture designed by a team of 3 dedicated individuals 
from the University of California, Berkeley. It is said to be the first fully-implemented 
link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks. Some of the eminent 
features are: 
1. It is caled lightweight because it doesn‘t ad much overhead unlike 802.1, 
GSM, Bluetooth etc.  
2. It is identified as a generic security package because it can be paired with other 
high level algorithms and be used as an open research platform for evaluating 
them. Also developers can easily integrate into other sensor network applications.  
3. TinySec is portable to a variety of hardware and radio platforms. It also has a 
software cryptographic module and doesn‘t ned any hardware asistance like 
Bluetooth, GSM etc.  
4. TinySec can be used for secure pair wise communication in public key 
cryptography. 
 
4.1 Why Link Layer security is needed? 
Link Layer security is needed, primarily because it is transparent and covers message 
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. Also the end to end security will not be 
possible since the communication frequency is dense and at times many sensors may note 
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the same change in environment parameters and send similar data to the base station. It 
will also increase the data length and use more energy.  
 
4.2 TinySec design: 
The following are the different operation modes of TinySec. It supports two different 
security options:  
1) Authenticated encryption (TinySec-AE) and  
2) Authentication only (TinySec-Auth).  
 
With the first one: authenticated encryption, TinySec encrypts the data packet and 
authenticates the packet with a MAC. The MAC is computed after the data has been 
encrypted along with the packet header. In authentication only mode, the data is not 
encrypted but TinySec authenticates the entire packet with a MAC. 
 
 
4.3 TinySec Packet Format: 
After seeing the different modes of Tinysec let us see the Tinysec and TinyOS data 
packets in the figure below. We will later compare these two data packets and observe 
interesting facts. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dest 
(2) 
AM 
(1) 
Len 
(1) 
Src 
(2) 
Ctr 
(2) 
Mac 
(4) 
Data 
(0.29) 
Dest 
(2) 
AM 
(1) 
Len 
(1) 
Mac 
(4) 
Data 
(0.29) 
(a) TinySec-AE packet format 
IV 
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(c)TinyOS Data Packet  
Figure 14: Tinysec data Packet 
The common fields are as follows: 
Dest: Destination address,  
AM: active message type, it is similar to port numbers in TCP/IP. The AM type specifies 
the appropriate handler function to decrypt, extract and interpret the message on the 
receiver side.    
Len: Length.  
As observed these fields are unencrypted because it can be sent in that fashion and 
also it may lead to saving some save power as, a sensor node may go back to sleep mode 
after determining that the message is not addressed to it.  
 
If the address and AM type are encrypted, early rejection cannot be invoked until 
after these fields are decrypted. This wastes power. Encrypting the length field adds little 
to security since the length of message can be inferred regardless.  
 
To detect transmission errors, TinyOS senders compute a 16-bit cycle redundancy 
check (CRC) over the packet. The receiver re-computes the CRC during reception and 
Dest 
(2) 
AM 
(1) 
Len 
(1) 
Data 
(0.29) 
CRC 
(2) 
Grp 
(1) 
(b) TinySec-Auth packet format 
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verifies it with the received CRC field. If they are equal, the receiver accepts the packet 
and rejects it otherwise. However, CRCs provide no security against malicious 
modification or forgery of packets.  
 
To guarantee message integrity and authenticity, TinySec replaces the CRC with a 
MAC. The MAC protects the entire packet, including the destination address, AM type, 
length, source address and counter (if present), and the data (whether encrypted or not). 
This protects the data from tampering. It also prevents attackers from redirecting a packet 
intended for one node to another node, and prevents packet truncation and other attacks. 
Since MACs detect malicious changes, they also detect transmission errors, and TinySec 
does not require a CRC. The TinyOS packet format contains a group field to prevent 
different sensor networks from interfering with each other. It can be thought of as a kind 
of weak access control mechanism for non-malicious environments.  
 
4.4 Using TinySec in TinyOS applications: 
TinySec is fairly easy to apply to the traditional non-security communication stack.  
In order to enable TinySec, include to Makefile, “TINYSEC=true”, or in command line 
type:  
 
“make platform_name_pc_mica_mica2 TINYSEC=true” 
 
By default TinySec will only authenticate all messages, without encryption. 
TinySecMode has two commands to setup transmit and receive mode. 
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Example: Enabling TinySec default settings. 
 
# add the following line in the Makefile 
TINYSEC=true 
COMPONENT=Blink 
include ../Makerules 
 
4.5 Different modes of operation in TinySec:  
 
There are different modes of operation for transmission and receiving in TinySec. 
Please refer to Appendix. 
 
4.5.1 Enabling TinySecMode: 
In order to change the modes of operations, TinySecMode interface must be used 
which can be exported using the TinySecC component.  Here are the steps to wire 
and setup. 
 
a. Ad ―TINYSEC=true‖ in Makefile 
b. In the interface file (*.nc), export from TinySecC component the TinySecMode 
interface. 
c. Wire the module component to the TinySecC. 
d. In the module file (*M.nc), ad in ―use‖, the TinySecMode interface. 
e. Call the commands to change the transmission/receive mode 
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Example: Setting modes of operation in TinySec to transmission encrypt and authenticate 
and receiving authenticated only using the example program Blink.  The Blink program 
just blinks the red led, and does not transmit or receive anything.  This example 
demonstrates how to wire and use the interface needed to enable TinySec.    
 
Blink.nc configuration file: 
configuration Blink {//1 Blink program 
} 
implementation { 
  components Main, BlinkM, SingleTimer, LedsC, 
  // 2) add TinySecC 
  TinySecC; 
  
  Main.StdControl -> SingleTimer.StdControl; 
  Main.StdControl -> BlinkM.StdControl; 
  BlinkM.Timer -> SingleTimer.Timer; 
  BlinkM.Leds -> LedsC; 
   
  // 3) Wiring 
  BlinkM.TinySecMode -> TinySecC.TinySecMode; 
} // Blink 
 
BlinkM.nc module file: 
module BlinkM { 
  provides { 
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    interface StdControl; 
  } 
uses { 
 interface Timer; 
  interface Leds; 
// 4) Add TinySecMode interface 
interface TinySecMode; 
} 
} 
 
implementation { 
  /**Initialize the component. @return Always returns <code> 
SUCCESS </code> **/ 
  command result_t StdControl.init() { 
    call Leds.init();  
 
    // 5) Setting modes of operation 
call 
TinySecMode.setTransmitMode(TINYSEC_ENCRYPT_AND_AUTH
); 
call 
TinySecMode.setReceiveMode(TINYSEC_RECEIVE_AUTH
ENTICATED); 
 
return SUCCESS; 
} 
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4.5.2 Key Management: 
TinySec uses symmetric keys to encrypt and authenticate messages.  When 
TinySec is first used a default key is created in a file called: 
~/.tinyos_keyfile, which looks like this: 
 
# TinySec Keyfile. By default, the first key will be 
used. 
# You can import other keys by appending them to the 
file. 
 
default A9FB5D03138166ABD1639B360E4263D4 
 
When programming devices, from different computers, they must all have the 
same key-file.  
When TinySec is enabled, the concept of ―groups‖ no longer exist. The motes 
will only receive messages from motes that share the same key, which is enforced 
cryptographically.   
 
Notice that he key stored in the ―.tinyos_keyfile‖ is composed of 32 hex values. 
TinySec uses key size of  8 bytes or 16 hex values.  The first 16 hex values are used as 
the key for encryption, and the last 16 hex values are used for authentication. 
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4.5.3 Updating Keys: 
 
TinySecControl enables the user to update TinySec keys and reset the 
initialization vector (IV), with these following commands: 
 
command result_t updateMACKey(uint8_t * MACKey); 
command result_t getMACKey(uint8_t * result); 
command result_t updateEncryptionKey(uint8_t * 
encryptionKey); 
command result_t getEncryptionKey(uint8_t * result); 
command result_t resetIV(); 
command result_t getIV(uint8_t * result) 
 
To enable these commands TinySecControl interface must be used.   
   
4.5.4 TinySec File: 
 
TinySec files can be located under the directory:  
/opt/tinyos-1.x/tos/lib/TinySec.   
Example files using TinySec for communication can be found under the directory: 
/opt/tinyos-1.x/apps/TestTinySec. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Encryption and Security Primitive 
 
This chapter is the most important as we will see the security modules.  
5.1 MAC: 
Earlier we had studied the security primitives for wireless security network such 
as message authenticity, integrity and confidentiality. Previous work has indicated that 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) can suffice the entire above said network needs. It 
is a secure checksum calculated with a cryptographic process. Under this the sender and 
receiver share a secret key. The sender node computes MAC over the data and appends to 
it. The receiver re computes the MAC (as it already knows the key) and compares the two 
MAC‘s. The dat is acepted if both the MAC‘s are qual. The benefit is that he nemy 
node doesn‘t know the secret MAC key so even if they can forge the data they can‘t 
compute the MAC and append to the data payload. 
 
5.2 Initialization Vector: 
The most common application in wireless sensor network for the nodes is to 
report the change in the surrounding conditions. For e.g. if the node is sending YES or 
NO, it will be obvious for the enemy to decode this as the encrypted part of YES and NO 
will be same all the time. Hence encryption of same plaintext twice should yield different 
cipher text. This is where Initialization vector comes is the scene as it adds variation. It is 
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also sent clearly with the data payload as it is used in the decryption process. The 
structure of IV is as follows: 
 
 
Obviously : 
Dst (2) : is the destination address 
AM (1): Active Message handler 
L (1): Length of data 
Src (2): Source address 
Ctr (2): Counter, it goes from 0 to 16 
Tinysec uses 8 byte IV structure which is pre encrypted for better security. IV reuse is not 
a problem unless key updates are not made. 
 
5.3 Encryption scheme: 
Tinysec uses Cipher block chaining (CBC) as the encryption scheme. Firstly 
because it is designed to be used with random IV‘s. Also encryption of two plaintexts P, 
P‘ with the same IV under CBC mode, wil reveal only the length (in blocks) of the 
longest shared prefix of P and P‘. That means CBC leaks only a small amount of 
information in the presence of repeated IVs. CBC is a kind of block cipher which 
operates on blocks typical 8 or 16 bytes. Also MAC protocol algorithms uses block 
structure hence blends well with CBC. Tinysec uses Skipjack for software 
implementation of block cipher.  
 
 
           Dst || AM|| L|| src || ctr 
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5.4 Skipjack: 
As mentioned before Skipjack [12] is the heart of operation for TinySec.  We 
shall see the operational details and algorithm in detail now. 
Skipjack uses 80 bit crypto variable and has 4 modes of operation. One of those is cipher 
Block Chaining, which we shall see next. Here is the figure: 
 
Figure 15: Cipher-Block Chaining Mode Diagram 
 
Following sections defines the basic notational terminology: 
5.4.1 Notation and terminology: 
nV : the set of all n-bit values. 
word: an element of 
16V ; a 16-bit value. 
byte: an element of 
8V ; an 8-bit value. 
permutation on 
nV : an invertible (one-to-one and onto) function from 
nV to 
nV .  
That is, the values are permuted within 
nV , not the bits 
within the value. 
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YX : the bitwise exclusive-or of X and Y. 
X
Y
: X concatenated with Y.  Let X, Y be bytes, then 
X
YXY 82
 is a word.  Furthermore, X is the high-
order byte, and Y is the low-order byte. 
 
5.4.2 Basic structure:   
SKIPJACK encrypts 4-word (i.e., 8-byte) data blocks by alternating between the two 
stepping rule (A and B) show below.  A step of rule A does the following: 
o G permutes 1w , 
o The new 1w  is the xor of the G output, the counter, and 4w  
o word 2w  and 3
w
 shift one register to the right; i.e., become 3
w
 and 4w  
respectively, 
o The new 2w  is the G output, 
o The counter is incremented by one. 
 
Rule B works similarly. 
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Figure 16: SKIPJACK Stepping Rules 
 
5.4.3 Stepping rules: 
In the equations below, the superscript is the step number. 
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Rule A Rule B 
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 Table 5: Encryptor & Decryptor 
 
5.4.4 Stepping sequence:  
The algorithm requires a total of 32 steps. 
 To encrypt:  The input is 
0
iw , 41 i , (i.e., k = 0 for the beginning step).  Start the 
counter at 1.  Step according to Rule A for 8 steps, then switch to Rule B and step 8 
more times.  Return to Rule A for the next 8 steps, then complete the encryption with 
8 steps in Rule B.  The counter increments by one after each step.  The output is 
32
iw , 
41 i . 
 To decrypt:  The input is is 
32
iw , 41 i , (i.e., k = 32 for the beginning step).  Start 
the counter at 32.  Step according to Rule B
-1
 for 8 steps, then switch to Rule A
-1
 and 
step 8 more times.  Return to Rule B
-1
 for the next 9 steps, then complete the 
decryption with 8 steps in Rule A
-1
.  The counter decrements by one after every step.  
The output is 
0
iw , 41 i . 
 
5.4.5 G-permutation:   
The cryptovariable-dependent permutation G on 
16V  is a four-round Feistel structure.  
The round function is a fixed byte-substitution table (permutation on 
8V ), which will 
be called the F-table.  Each round of G also incorporates a byte of cryptovariable.  We 
give two characterizations of the function below: 
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 Recursively (mathematically):  6521 )( ggggwG
k  where 
2341 )( iikii gcvgFg  and where k is the step number (the first step is 0), F is 
the substitution table, and 34 ikcv  is the (4k + i-3)
th
 byte in the cryptovariable 
schedule.  Thus, 
1423 )( gcvgFg k  
21434 )( gcvgFg k  
32445 )( gcvgFg k  
43456 )( gcvgFg k  
Similarly, for the inverse, ][ kG  2165
1 )( ggggw  where 
iikii gcvgFg )( 3412  . 
 
Figure 17: G-permutation diagram 
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5.4.6 Cryptovariable schedule:   
The cryptovariable is 10 bytes long (labeled 0 through 9) and used in its natural order.  
So the schedule subscripts given in the definition of the G-permutation are to be 
interpreted mod-10. 
 
5.4.7 F Table:   
The SKIPJACK F-table is given below in hexadecimal notation.  The high order 4 
bits of the input index the row and the low order 4 bits index the column.  For 
example, F(7a) = d6. 
 
 
 Table 4: Sample F Table 
 
 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 xA xB xC xD xE xF 
0x a3 d7 09 83 f8 48 f6 f4 b3 21 15 78 99 b1 af f9 
1x e7 3d 4d 8a ce 4c ca 2e 52 95 d9 1e 4e 38 44 28 
2x 0a df 02 a0 17 f1 60 68 12 b7 7a c3 e9 fa 3d 53 
3x 96 84 6b Ba f2 63 9a 19 7c ae e5 f5 f7 16 6a a2 
4x 39 b6 7b 0f c1 93 81 1b ee b4 1a ea d0 91 2f b8 
5x 55 b9 Da 85 3f 41 bf e0 5a 58 80 5f 77 0b d8 90 
6x 35 d5 c0 a7 33 06 65 69 45 00 94 56 6d 98 9b 76 
7x 97 fc b2 c2 b0 fe db 200 e1 eb d6 e4 dd 47 4a 1d 
8x 42 ed 9e 6e 49 3c cd 43 27 d2 07 d3 de c7 67 18 
9x 89 cb 30 1f 8d c6 8f aa c8 74 dc c9 5d 5c 31 a4 
Ax 70 88 61 2c 9f 0d 2b 87 50 82 54 64 26 7d 03 40 
Bx 34 4b 1c 73 d1 c4 fd 3b cc fb 7f ab e6 3e 5b a5 
Cx Ad 04 23 9c 14 51 22 f0 29 79 71 7e ff 8c 0e e2 
Dx 0c ef Bc 72 75 6f 37 a1 ec d3 8e 62 8b 86 10 e8 
Ex 08 77 11 Be 92 4f 24 c5 32 36 9d cf f3 a6 bb ac 
Fx 5e 6c a9 13 57 25 b5 e3 bd a8 3a 01 05 59 2a 46 
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Chapter 6 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
Elliptic curve systems as applied to cryptography were first proposed in 1985 
independently by Neal Koblitz from the University of Washington, and Victor Miller, 
who was then at IBM, Yorktown Heights. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an 
approach to public-key cryptography based on the mathematics of elliptic curves. It 
provides fast decryption and digital signature processing. The main benefit of ECC is 
that under certain situations it uses smaller keys than other methods — such as RSA 
— while providing an equivalent or higher level of security. ECC uses points on an 
elliptic curve to derive a 163-bit public key that is equivalent in strength to a 1024-bit 
RSA key. Hence smaller number of keys lead to faster key operation and less 
memory need. It is said to be ideal for resource-constrained systems because it 
provides more "security per bit" than other types of asymmetric cryptography. One 
drawback, however, is that the implementation of encryption and decryption 
operations may take longer than in other schemes.  
 
6.2 Motivation for using Elliptic Curve Cryptography: 
As previously mentioned before RSA and ECC are both public key 
algorithms. RSA [8] is the most used public key algorithm but ECC [9] can provide 
the same security at much smaller key size. RSA-1024 is equivalent to ECC-160 bit 
key [10]. It has also been also calculated that by the year 2010 we have to use RSA-
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2048 but in case of ECC: ECC-224 will be needed! In this section we will see the 
comparison between both and learn why ECC is better for the embedded sensor 
network as a public key algorithm. The energy analysis has been done on the 
Mica2dots[2], which is one of the popular research platforms  for WSN. [10] It has 
been noted that the power required to transmit 1 bit is equivalent to roughly 2090 
clock cycles of execution on the Mica2dot microcontroller. The cost of receiving one 
byte (28.6µJ) is roughly half of that required to transmit a byte (59.2 µJ). During 
transmit and receive, the microcontroller is powered on along with the wireless 
transceiver. The usual packet size is 32 for the payload and 9 bytes for the header. 
The header, ensuing a 8-byte preamble, consists of source, destination, length, packet 
ID, CRC, and a control byte. Receiving one 41-byte packet (including 8-byte 
preamble) costs 49*28.6uJ=1.40mJ and transmitting one 41-byte packet costs 
49*59.2uJ=2.90mJ. To summarize: 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Mathematics for RSA Vs ECC: 
Verification of RSA is cheap but what makes it expensive is the signature for 
authentication. This is due to the fact that RSA-based key exchange protocol relies on 
party A to encrypt a randomly generated secret key with party B's public key, and 
party B decrypting the key using its private key. Now for ECC the signature 
Effective data rate 12.4 kbps 
Energy to transmit 59.2 µJ/byte 
Energy to receive 28.6 µJ/byte 
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algorithm is called: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm [ECDSA][11]. For 
ECDSA the signature and verification both are inexpensive. The transition from 
RSA-1024 to RSA-2048 the energy cost of signing increases by a factor of more than 
seven, while ECDSA-224 signing is less than three times as expensive as ECDSA-
160 signing. With ECC, both parties perform a single ECDH operation to derive the 
secret key. From [10]:  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Comparison chart for RSA and ECC 
The above is measured in mille Joules. 
Hence with the facts, figures and numbers we can clearly say that ECC is the better 
choice than the most popularly used encryption algorithm for WSN. 
 
6.4 Asymmetric Cryptography as fine balance: 
It has been claimed that public key cryptosystems are not feasible to 
implement in these tiny devices because they are constrained with less resources but 
this is not true [33]. Asymmetric cryptography is a marvelous technology. Its uses are 
many and varied. 
           For many situations in distributed network environments, asymmetric 
cryptography is a must during communications. For instance key distribution or any 
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kind of network protocol or application requiring secure communications such as 
buying something on the Internet, when the vendor is using a secure server.  
 
But asymmetric cryptography is demanding and complex, by nature. The hard 
problems in number theory — the key to the algorithms' functionality — are all 
intrinsically difficult.  
Let‘s see some of the features of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and later see the 
justification so as to need this in the sensor networks. 
1) ECC offers considerably greater security for a given key size  
2) The smaller key size also makes possible much more compact 
implementations for a given level of security, which means faster 
cryptographic operations, running on smaller chips or more compact software. 
This means less heat production and less power consumption — all of which 
is of particular advantage in constrained devices, but of some advantage 
anywhere else.  
3) There are extremely efficient, compact hardware implementations available 
for ECC exponentiation operations, offering potential reductions in 
implementation footprint even beyond those due to the smaller key length 
alone.  
In short: asymmetric cryptography is demanding but looking at the cryptosystem for 
more security per bit, ECC is a better choice. 
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6.5 Why Asymmetric Cryptography? 
Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms do not use a single key as in symmetric 
cryptographic algorithms such as AES, but a key pair. One of the keys (the public 
key) is used for encryption, and its corresponding private key must be used for 
decryption. The critical feature of asymmetric cryptography, which makes it useful, is 
this key pair — and more specifically, a particular feature of the key pair: the fact that 
one of the keys cannot be obtained from the other. In all asymmetric cryptosystems, 
as mentioned above, the key length is the parameter that determines how difficult 
both the forward and inverse algorithms are. 
Hence, the inverse operation rapidly becomes more difficult as key length increases 
than does the forward operation. 
 
6.6 Authentication with Asymmetric Cryptography: 
In the case of asymmetric authentication methods there are two main entities: 
private key (in the possession of the entity wishing to prove its identity) and the 
public key (in the possession of anyone who wishes to verify the identity of the entity 
possessing the private key). 
The Public key can verify the knowledge of the private key but the private key 
cannot be derived from the public key. This is the critical feature of asymmetric 
cryptographic schemes that makes them so useful.  
This property is useful for a number of reasons: it greatly simplifies key 
exchange, as one example, and it solves one critical problem symmetric cryptography 
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cannot solve — the problem of guaranteeing unique authentication and non-
repudiation. Symmetric hashing/authentication methods — ones for which there is 
only one key, and both parties in the exchange use it both for authentication and for 
signature generation — have the distinct disadvantage that they do not, on their own, 
offer any way to distinguish which party to the exchange signed a given message. If 
both or all parties must know the key, based on cryptography alone, you cannot 
distinguish which signed any given message, because any of them could have. In 
asymmetric authentication schemes, only one party knows the private key, with 
which the message is signed. Any number may know the public key. Since the private 
key cannot be derived from the public, the signature serves as a unique identifier. If 
the message verifies as having been signed by the  
person with knowledge of the private key, we can narrow down who sent the message 
to one. But any number of people may have knowledge of the public key, and all of 
them can therefore verify the identity of the sender.  
 
6.7 How are elliptic curves used? 
The crucial property of an elliptic curve is that we can define a rule for 
"adding" two points which are on the curve, to obtain a 3rd point which is also on the 
curve. Having defined addition of two points, we can also define multiplication k*P 
where k is a positive integer and P is a point as the sum of k copies of P. 
Thus 2*P = P+P 
3*P = P+P+P 
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Alice, Bob, Cathy, David... agree on a (non-secret) elliptic curve and a (non-
secret) fixed curve point F. Alice chooses a secret random integer Ak which is her 
secret key, and publishes the curve point AP = Ak*F as her public key. Bob, Cathy 
and David do the same. Now suppose Alice wishes to send a message to Bob. One 
method is for Alice to simply compute Ak*BP and use the result as the secret key for 
a conventional symmetric block cipher (say DES). 
Bob can compute the same number by calculating Bk * AP, since Bk*AP = 
Bk*(Ak*F) = (Bk*Ak)*F = Ak*(Bk*F) = Ak*BP. 
Although the starting point and public key are known, it is extremely difficult 
to backtrack and derive the private key. An essential property for cryptography is that 
a group has a finite number of points. 
 
6.8 The Diffie Hellman/DSA Cryptosystems and the Discrete Logarithm 
Problem: 
Diffie Hellman along with the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) based on it 
is another of the asymmetric cryptosystems in general use. 
 
ECC, in a sense, is an evolved form of Diffie Hellman. So to understand how ECC 
works, it helps to understand how Diffie Hellman works first. 
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Diffie Hellman uses a problem known as the discrete logarithm problem as its central, 
asymmetric operation. The discrete log problem concerns finding a logarithm of a 
number within a finite field arithmetic system. 
 
Prime fields are fields whose sets are prime that is, they have a prime number of 
members. These are of particular interest in asymmetric cryptography because, over a 
prime field, exponentiation turns out to be a relatively easy operation, while the 
inverse  computing the logarithm  is very difficult. 
 
To generate a key pair in the discrete logarithm (DL) system, therefore, the 
calculation is as follows:  
 
y=(gx)mod p 
 
where p is a large prime — the field size. x and g are smaller than p. y is the public 
key. x is used as the private key. In Diffie Hellman, again, the operations we wish to 
make 'easy', or tractable, we harness to the operation in the field which is (relatively) 
easy — exponentiation. So encryption using the public key is an exponentiation 
operation. Decryption using the private key is as well. Decryption using the public 
key, however, would require performing the difficult inverse operation — solving the 
discrete logarithm problem. 
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The discrete logarithm problem, using the values in the equation above, is simply 
finding x given only y, g and p. 
 
Expanding that thought slightly: someone has multiplied g by itself x times, 
and reduced the result into the field (performed the modulo operation) as often as 
necessary to keep the result smaller than p. Now, knowing y, g and p, you're trying to 
find out what value of x they used. 
 
It turns out that for large enough values of p, where p is prime, this is 
extraordinarily difficult to do — much more difficult than just finding y from g, x and 
p. 
 
ECC defines its group differently. And it is, in fact, the difference in how the group is 
defined and particularly how the mathematical operations within the group are 
defined that give ECC its greater security for a given key size.  
 
6.9 The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem: 
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [27] is the cornerstone of much 
of present-day elliptic curve cryptography. It relies on the natural group law on a non-
singular elliptic curve which allows one to add points on the curve together. Given an 
elliptic curve E over a finite field F, a point on that curve, P, and another point you 
know to be an integer multiple of that point, Q, the ``problem'' is to find the integer n 
such that: nP=Q 
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The problem is computationally difficult unless the curve has a ``bad'' number 
of points over the given field, where the term ``bad'' encompasses various collections 
of numbers of points which make the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem 
breakable. For example, if the number of points on E over F is the same as the 
number of elements of F, then the curve is vulnerable to attack. It is because of these 
issues that point-counting on elliptic curves is such a hot topic in elliptic curve 
cryptography. 
The inverse operation to point multiplication finding a log in a group defined 
on an elliptic curve over a prime field is defined as follows: given points Q and P, 
find the integer k such that Q= kP. 
 
This is the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and this is the inverse 
operation in the cryptosystem  the one we effectively have to perform to get the 
plaintext back from the cipher text, given only the public key. 
 
Now naively the obvious, certain way of finding k would be to perform 
repeated addition operations stepping through P, 2P, 3P, and so on, until we find kP. 
Begin by doubling P, then adding P to 2P finding 3P, then 3P to P finding 4P and so 
on. This is the brute force method. The difficulty with this approach is by using a 
large enough prime field, the number of possible values for k becomes inconveniently 
large. So inconveniently large that it's quite practical to create a sufficiently large 
prime field that searching through the possible values of k would take all the 
processor time currently available on the planet thousands of years. 
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6.10 Elliptic curve groups [13]: 
Many cryptosystems require the use of algebraic groups. Elliptic curves may 
be used to form elliptic curve groups. A group is a set of elements with custom-
defined arithmetic operations on those elements. For elliptic curve groups, these 
specific operations are defined geometrically. Introducing more stringent properties to 
the elements of a group, such as limiting the number of points on an elliptic curve, 
creates an underlying field for an elliptic curve group.  
 
6.11 Implementation of ECC in NesC for Mica2: [14] 
Up until now Tinysec implements symmetric key cryptography. In this section 
this thesis work depicts how asymmetric key cryptography can be implemented in 
these tiny devices.  
The code is in the following directory: 
/opt/tinyos-1.x/apps/EccM-2.0 
 
Figure 19: EccM Directory in Cygwin 
The original code has errors and gives the error  
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EccM.nc:968: interface has no command or event named `get' 
 
For higher version of TinyOs (greater than tinyos 1.1.0) the code has to be modified 
as follows:  
 
 
// this is old SysTime 
// call SysTime.get(&before); 
// This line has to be replaced as follows 
    before = call SysTime.getTime32(); 
 
//  this is old SysTime 
//  call SysTime.get(&after); 
// This line has to be replaced as follows 
    after = call SysTime.getTime32(); 
 
To fix the ―int‖ problem, it needs to be commented out, since it gets automatically 
initiated. 
 
// initialize clock 
// result = rcombine(call SysTime.init(), result); 
After these fixes, it should compile successfully on mica2 platform.  The code then 
can be downloaded and tested on the mica2 hardware.   
Install the ECC demo code in each of the motes giving them a unique ID, with the 
command: make mica2dot install.1 MIB510=COM5 
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Figure 20: Installing Ecc on mica2dot (id # 1) 
Similarly for the other mote: 
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Figure 21: Installing Ecc on mica2dot (id # 2) 
 
To run the demo on the two motes: 
 
One mote should be left on the programming board, to be connected to the 
computer with a serial cable/ USB . Execute a serial forwarder on your computer, as 
with the command below, adjusting as needed for your particular configuration.  
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java net.tinyos.sf.SerialForwarder -comm serial@COM5:19200 –
no-gui  
 
 
With the SerialForwarder backgrounded (or running in its own terminal), also the 
following has to be executed : 
 
    java Ecc 
 
which will simply report to standard output any messages delivered to the UART on 
the programming board. 
 
Turn both motes on, roughly simultaneously. The mote will turn on the yellow LED 
when the private/public keys are generated.   
  
Here are the results for the ECC code from the window that was running 
serialforwarder, which is a program written in java to the packets sent by the motes 
through the serial port: 
 
$ java net.tinyos.sf.SerialForwarder -comm serial@COM1:57600 -
no-gui  
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Figure 22: Ecc result 
In text format it is as follows: 
$ java Ecc 
privKeyTime: 0.23898398981416266 
pubKeyTime: 35.265216990843584 
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secKeyTime: 35.308831879503714 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23686663596467467 
pubKeyTime: 35.028514655686195 
secKeyTime: 35.134459554640515 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23603036788210435 
pubKeyTime: 35.922323237795965 
secKeyTime: 35.723772010619285 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23516728070650703 
pubKeyTime: 34.74242645066912 
secKeyTime: 34.78137468169258 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23472286937205397 
pubKeyTime: 35.36152652110311 
secKeyTime: 35.37715527983963 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23735059868884437 
pubKeyTime: 34.95089667876687 
secKeyTime: 35.0038926965379 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23550495746871108 
pubKeyTime: 35.81251259684673 
secKeyTime: 35.66207062361163 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23748266240450777 
pubKeyTime: 34.27488121038089 
secKeyTime: 34.16137928699139 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23441756515143308 
pubKeyTime: 36.48261838326922 
secKeyTime: 36.577420355420706 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23760592187246032 
pubKeyTime: 33.955729398060356 
secKeyTime: 33.88390718968413 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23957495801051093 
pubKeyTime: 33.809408219103865 
secKeyTime: 33.82116175434794 
 
privKeyTime: 0.23542328113994693 
pubKeyTime: 37.43303611096061 
secKeyTime: 37.327121552798395 
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privKeyTime: 0.2384975889906269 
pubKeyTime: 35.64787790540174 
secKeyTime: 35.68060586769248 
 
 
nxv1458@drwho3 /opt/tinyos-1.x/apps/EccM-2.0 
$ 
 
 
The ECC code is known to be CPU intensive, and thus take a long time to 
generate the keys.  During this time, events posted by other asynchronous events 
might fil up the TinyOS‘s queue. During this demo, timers were used to avoid this 
kind of problem and it is sufficient for demo purposes.  As for real usage of this code, 
it is recommended by the author to use a cooperative threading mechanism for 
TinyOS such as one developed by Geoffrey Mainlands Fibers module. 
 
CPU intensive also means it uses a lot of power.  This was observed on the 
mote that was connected to the PC.  After running it for about 40 minutes, the power 
LED on the MIB510 programming board started to blink, which signals low power.  
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6.12 Conclusion: EC for Portable Devices, Aplications …and for the Future 
 
And this, in the end, is the reason ECC is a stronger option than the RSA and 
discrete logarithm systems for the future. The research shows that ECC is an excellent 
choice for doing asymmetric cryptography in portable, necessarily constrained 
devices. 
 
As an example: as of this writing, a popular, recommended RSA key size for 
most applications is 2,048 bits. For equivalent security using ECC, a key of only 224 
bits is needed. ECC also provides more security per bit and meets the constrained 
power demands of sensor devices [32]. 
 
The difference becomes more and more pronounced as security levels increase 
(and, as a corollary, as hardware gets faster, and the recommended key sizes must be 
increased). A 384 -bit ECC key matches a 7680-bit RSA key for security.  
 
The smaller ECC keys mean the cryptographic operations that must be 
performed by the communicating devices can be squeezed into considerably smaller 
hardware, that software applications may complete cryptographic operations with 
fewer processor cycles, and operations can be performed that much faster, while still 
guaranteeing equivalent security.  
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This results, in turn, less heat, less power consumption, less real estate 
consumed on the printed circuit board, and software applications that run more 
rapidly and make lower memory demands. Leading in turn to more portable devices 
which run longer, and produce less heat. 
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Chapter 7 
Energy analysis: 
To refresh Mica2/ Mica2dots have TinyOS as the operating system and  
TinySec as the security protocol. The security has been enhanced by implementing 
ECC.  
Tinysec operates in two modes: ‗AE‘ which as 42 bytes and ‗A‘ which as 38 bytes 
to send. 
 
The energy equation for communicating over the distance r is as follows: 
e(r) =  et(r) + er(r) [29] (from main thesis) 
i.e. the energy spent is the sum total of energy spent is transmitting and receiving the 
data packets. 
Note: in this document tx is used for transmitting and rx refers to receiving data. 
Even when the network is idle a certain non-zero level of power is radiated. Energy is 
spent in encrypting, decrypting, transmitting, receiving, buffering and processing.  
 
The most typical case where the node that is receiving and at the same time 
transmitting has been discussed below. The power for receiving is usually constant 
because it buffers the data. Therefore the total energy/power (denoted by p- function 
of r= p(r)) required for communicating between the base station and / or nodes over 
distance ‗r‘ is as folows [28]:  
p(r) = max/ min transmitting power + receiving power. 
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Total p(r) = max {pmin , c.r } + prx 
 
Here 
= power loss in the path which multiplies by the distance
 
pmin = minimum transmitter power  
prx  = fixed overhead for receiving data and  
c = constant, function of transmitter distance from the base station 
 
The current work has been implemented with ECC for 160 bit keys; the case scenario 
is as follows: 
Laptop= base station     Mica2= nodes 
 
Here are the following formula has been used: 
Watt = Joules/ sec 
= Volt * Ampere 
= Volt * Coulomb/Sec 
Joules = Volt * Ampere * sec 
From specification sheet ([2] – thesis page #80) the following is the current 
consumption: 
Sensor board: (transmitting): 5mA 
Microprocessor: (transmitting): 6 mA 
Radio: (transmitting): 12 mA 
Total= 23 mA 
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Also after running the set up for ECC- 162 (result at page 66) time consumed 
is on an average= 35 sec for key generation for AE data packets. This experiment is 
for worst case scenario therfore, doesn‘t include the pre deployment or hard coding 
of the key. 
 
Hence, the energy calculation after running ECC (from page 66) is as follows: 
 
At transmitting side (for Authentication encryption mode):  
Energy consumed (Joules) = Key generation + energy used to transmit 42 bytes 
+ signature 
= 226.65 mJ [Ref: 36] + volt * (23 mA) * 35 secs + 134.2 mJ (constant for signing, 
irrespective of byte size) 
By observation the volt (battery power) varies as a function of the distance between 
the transmitting and receiving entities. The mica2 uses 2 AA battery which provides 
3v. 
For calculation purpose and from experimental observation the volt is assumed to be 
0.01 constant then the energy consumed during transmitting AE type of Tinysec data 
packet will be: 
= .22665 + 0.01* .805 + .1342 -- Joules 
= .22665 + .00805 +.134 
= .3687 J 
Similar calculation can be done for receiver side: 
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Energy consumed (Joules) = Key Verify + energy used to receive 42 bytes  
= 196.23 mJ [Ref: 36] + volt * [(6+5) m A] * 35 secs 
= .19623 + 0.01 * .385 – Joules 
= .1962 + .00385 
= .2 J 
There is no use of radio as the data is received in this case. 
Also for the sleep mode in which the node may be residing is not considered. 
Considering it adds an overhead of the following [2]: 
Microprocessor = 8 mA 
Radio = 2 mA 
Sensor Board = 5 uA 
 
Now for Authentication mode the data packet size reduces to 38 bytes. 
For Mica2 dots the numbers differ by the following [35]: 
Energy to transmit: 59.2 microJ/byte 
Energy to receive: 28.6 microJ/byte 
 
For transmitting: 
Energy consumed (Joules) = Key generation + energy used to transmit 42 bytes + 
signature 
= 226.65 mJ + 59.2 uJ * 42 + 134.2 mJ 
= 363.336 mJ 
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For Receiving: 
Energy consumed (Joules) = Key Verify + energy used to receive 42 bytes  
= 196.23 mJ+ 28.6 uJ * 42 
= 196.23 mJ + 1.201 mJ 
= 197.43 mJ 
Now for Authentication mode the data packet size reduces to 38 bytes. 
 
7.1 Memory Overhead: 
Typically nodes are deployed in thousands. In the current set up there are only 2 
mica2 and 2 mica2 dots. Under pragmatic scenario for 10,000 nodes deployed each 
node will have 30 neighbors (for dense connection) with whom they have to share the 
key. If every node stores 30 keys of 192 bits, which will be way less than 1 Kbytes of 
RAM memory. This is the overhead for each node. 
 
7.2 Comparison with RSA (asymmetric cryptography): [36] 
Below is a comparison of energy spent (in mJ) for ECC with RSA for two different 
key lengths. As mentioned before RSA-1024 is equivalent to ECDSA -160 and RSA- 
2048 is equivalent to ECDSA -224. 
 
Algorithm Key Generation Signature - mJ Verify - mJ 
RSA – 1024 270.13 304 11.9 
ECDSA -160 226.65 134.2 196.23 
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Table 6: Comparison Table for ECC and RSA (Overhead) 
 
7.3 Comparison with Symmetric Counter Part: 
Although Symmetric key cryptographic systems are 2-4 times faster they 
require pre – distribution of keys and storage of n-1 keys. For e.g. for small network 
of say 1024 nodes the scheme with 128 keys will require 1024 * 128 = 16 Kbytes of 
Ram memory. 
 
Even the random pair wise distribution where the secret keys stored are n * p 
where n is number of node and p is the probability of sharing key with other node. It 
is not scalable for big network system hence it gets worse. 
 
7.4 Comparison with One Time Sensors: [35] 
According to the commonly used scheme for one time sensors the nodes need 
to be pre loaded before deployment. It is loaded with single cryptographic key, node 
id and list of hashed values. For e.g for a big network of 10,000 nodes with 128 bit 
key value, 64 bit hash value the total Ram value will be around 80 Kbytes. For small 
network with ~ 1000 nodes the Ram value will be little over 8 Kbytes. Combining 
with another scheme even with storing the least significant bits of the Id the total ram 
value is 8 Kbytes.  
 
As mentioned before in great detail about different modes of skipjack, the 
simplest is the ECB. Other modes (cipher block chaining (CBC), cipher-feedback 
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mode (CFB), and output-feedback mode (OFB)) employ a feedback mechanism so 
that the encryption of a plain-text block is made dependent on the results of 
encryption of previous plain-text blocks. Due to the feedback mechanism, even for 
the same key, a given plain-text will not always map to the same ciphertext. In 
addition to variants due to operating mode considerations, there are variants of the 
basic DES algorithm such as DES-X. The corresponding energy consumption profile 
is plotted in figure below: [36] 
 
 Figure 23: Energy consumption for CBC and variants of DES 
Proposed methods to reduce energy overhead are: 
1. Alternate between sleep and idle modes 
2. Synchronization using Virtual clustering of nodes on same sleep schedule.  
3. Use of in-network signaling so that the neighbor nodes can go to sleep when    
the nodes are transmitting the data. 
  76 
4. Transmission of data in store-forward format. Hence the data is sent in chunks 
and the nodes that have large chunks of data to be sent can access the channel. 
 
Under this practice the nodes first listen for a certain amount of time. If there is no 
change in the environment and if none of the neighbors want to talk then it goes to 
sleep and puts a timer on itself to wake up later. It also switches off its radio. Also the 
nodes can synchronize with its neighbors so that they sleep and wake up at the same 
time. Nodes also exchange their schedule by broadcasting to its immediate neighbors. 
If a node receives the schedule from its neighbor before broadcasting its schedule 
then it adjusts its schedule accordingly. It is called a follower. In order to have 
collision avoidance the nodes have to contend for the medium. There is a duration 
field in each transmitted packet that indicates how long the transmission will be, 
hence it knows how long to sleep for. This can also help in the overhearing problem, 
so that the nodes know that the data is not meant for it.  
 
[21] also suggests that unequal clustering can lead to better energy management. 
In the wireless networks (multi hop scenario) the nodes organize themselves to form 
clusters. The cluster has a cluster head which aggregates the data and sends it to the 
base station. The clusters have inter and intra communication. The energy consumed 
on intra-cluster communication changes proportionally with the number of nodes 
within a cluster, while the energy spent on inter-cluster communication (i.e., 
forwarding data from other clusters) is a function of the expected load from the 
clusters further away. Therefore, by changing the number of nodes in every cluster 
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with respect to the expected relay load, the network can maintain more uniform 
energy consumption. The cluster formation can either be static or dynamic. This can 
depend on various factors like energy remaining, distance from cluster head etc. 
 
7.5 Analysis of models: [22] 
Various models have been studied and devised for analyzing the networks. 
Two major categories are the Time based and Packet based models. Time based 
models analyzes the network in terms of time spent doing calculation, processing and 
how it can be reduced. The Packet based model analyzes how to make the packet size 
accommodate all necessary data and control information yet not over burden the 
nodes or for that matter the cluster head, this may also help in solving the hot-spot 
problem. 
 
Analysis has also been done with [23] Network Models. They have been 
categorized into: Homogenous and Hybrid. Homogenous networks have similar kinds 
of nodes and they take turns in becoming the cluster head. Also they have similar 
processing power and sleep schedules. The deployment of these nodes can be either 
pre determined or random. 
In heterogeneous networks nodes with higher processing power and better 
energy saving protocols are the cluster heads. They are deployed as another layer. 
The other nodes have to determine the closest such nodes and affiliate to its cluster.  
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Much work has been done with traffic models.  Two kinds of traffic models 
have been identified: Under Ad Hoc model: where nodes can be sender or receiver 
and they communicate one-to-one. Second kind: Sensor Traffic Model, in which all 
nodes are senders and they communicate to sink (cluster head). 
 
Other models [24] suggest that the duty of being the cluster head should be 
rotated among the nodes which have relatively highly energy.  
[25] Suggests that when the nodes communicate they send information to the 
neighboring nodes to forward to cluster head. They take turns to do so hence by 
alternating their chance with sleep they save energy. This works well for even as well 
as odd number of nodes. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis work gives a better understanding of the sensor networks in terms 
of their working environment, threats, attacks and security protocols. This work 
emphasized and brought out in light the security algorithm called Skipjack and 
enhanced it with Elliptic Curve Cryptography. The idea for ECC has been borrowed 
from Mathematics where the unique property of Elliptic curves have been used and 
proved that Asymmetric Cryptography can be implemented in these minuscule sensor 
devices. As observed it drains the battery supply but there has to be a trade off 
between the energy utilized and level of security threshold. This thesis work also 
described the energy consumption for all flavors and modes of tinysec with ECC and 
its overhead analysis when compared to symmetric techniques. Most of the modern 
sensors today operate on renewable energy source hence public key cryptography can 
be implemented in embedded sensor devices.  
 
The future work will include a good support from routing and clustering 
schemes which can further enhance better security systems to keep away adversaries 
and eaves droppers. Perhaps ECDSA can be implemented in hardware and its energy 
consumption can be monitored on a bigger scale and more practical platform. Also 
the current working platform was mica2 and mica2 dots which are research platforms; 
they should be tried on the more modern industrial level sensors available in the 
market. 
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This work has seen the codes in NesC in linux environment which is not very 
user friendly, it can be further extended to windows based application and software 
which will create more awareness and harness it at research level. This will help in 
eliminating the various security threats and improve secure data transmission 
protocol.  
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Appendix 
 
1) The system specifications for message format are as follows: 
 
Specifications Value units 
Msg Size 40 bytes 
Msg Preamble 16 bytes 
Baud Rate 38400 baud 
Duty Cycle 0.5 % 
# of msgs to rcv/re-xmit 
during wake time 
5 msg 
 
Table 7: Message Format for Energy Overhead 
2) Transmit mode: 
 
  command result_t setTransmitMode( argument ); 
 
Different modes of operation for transmit 
Mode Argument Description 
Default TINYSEC_AUTH_ONLY Sends authenticated 
message 
Encryption TINYSEC_ENCRPT_AND_AUTH Sends encrypted and 
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authenticated message 
Disabled TINYSEC_DISABLED Sends with standard 
TinyOS radio stack 
 
Table 8: TinySec Operating Modes for transmitting 
 
 
Receive mode: 
 
  command result_t setReceiveMode( argument ); 
 
Different modes of operation for receiving 
 
Mode Argument Description 
Default TINYSEC_RECEIVE_AUTHENTICATED Receives only authenticated or 
encrypted /authenticated 
modes 
Disabled TINYSEC_RECEIVE_CRC Receives only from disabled 
mode 
All TINYSEC_RECEIVE_ANY Accepts from all modes 
 
Table 9: TinySec Operating Modes for receiving 
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3) [23] (Reference from main thesis) the energy equation gets modified for the 
heterogeneous networks. This has not been implemented in this work but in a 
heterogeneous network, there are cluster heads which communicate to base 
station after collecting data from the ordinary low power sensors. The energy 
model for the simplest heterogeneous network can be written as follows: 
  
Energy spent in transmission: edbd
a
 + etb and  
Energy spent in reception: elb 
Energy spent sensing: esb 
 
Definition of terms: 
ed : Energy spent in reception 
et :  Energy spent in transmission 
el: Energy spent by reception circuitry 
esb: Energy spent sensing each bit  
b: Number of bits to be transmitted/ received 
d: distance of receiver from transmitter 
a: constant 
The model changes for the networks which communicate by hop by hop mode [23]. 
The above model is limited to communication aspect of the model. 
The heterogeneous network has overlay sensors which act as cluster heads as per 
energy available. In every round R they get to become cluster head once. The 
expected energy spent every R round is as follows: 
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Wo=K1 + (K2+ A1 E[d
a
] ) Co(q) 
 
Wo = Energy consumed by overlay sensor 
q= average number of clusters in network 
K1, A1 and K2 = Constants 
Co(q) = Expected number of transmission in order to have a successful transmission  
 
Similarly energy spent by normal sensor will be as follows: 
Ws=K3 + (K4+ A2 E[s
a
] ) Cs(n/q) 
 
Here: 
Ws  = Energy consumed by sensor 
s= random variable denoting distance from sensor to cluster head 
K3, A2 and K4 = Constants 
Co(n/q) = Expected number of transmission in order to have a successful transmission 
within the cluster. This depends on the MAC function used in the network. 
 
Let Z= d
2  
then: 
E[Z] = E[d
2 
] 
 
In heterogeneous system the energy has to be balanced between the ordinary sensors 
and the overlay sensors. One way is to balance the energy. Let be the energy 
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allocated to the overlay sensors and  be the energy allocated to the normal 
sensors then: 
                                                                                     
-----------------------------------          =          --------------------------------- 
K1 + (K2+ A1 E[d
a
] ) Co(q)                         K3 + (K4+ A2 E[s
a
] ) Cs(n/q) 
Hence the number of rounds the overlay and normal sensors should last is as follows: 
                            R ( ) 
Rs   =   ------------------------------------ 
              K3 + (K4+ A2 E[s
a
] ) Cs(n/q) 
 
 
 
